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INSTITUTIONAL INTERFACES AND ACTORS’ BEHAVIOR  







The post cold war period which started by the collapse of communism in the former Soviet 
Republic and East European communist bloc in the early 1990s has heralded a transition from 
centrally planned economy to a free market economy. Real estate property and the role of 
institutions in development have become the main manifestations and components of this 
transition.  However as compared to the transitional economies of East Europe, the case of 
the transition of former socialist oriented developing countries like Ethiopia seems to win less 
attention than it deserves.  The economic transformation of these countries is not 
characterized by a transition from agriculture to industrialization but to an urban economy 
marked by informality dominated weak service sector activities fueled by high rural urban 
migration.  
 
This research establishes niche by contrasting two views on the transition of such developing 
countries: one of De Soto’s(1989, 2000) liberal market consensus view based on ‘secure, 
reliable property rights’ through the hidden revolution of informality and the role of the state 
being minimized, and the other -  Khan’s (2002, 2003)  social transformation or 
developmental state view which revokes the ‘stable property rights’ motto and upholds the 
necessity of making massive interventions in reallocation of property rights by dynamic states 
in the interest of growth and creating dynamic capitalist classes. The main research question 
is how formal informal institutions interface and influence actors’ behaviour in transitional 
real estate markets of Addis Ababa. The research analytical framework is developed taking 
elements of Williamson’s (2000) level of institutional analysis, Institutional Analysis and 
Development framework (IAD) (Ostrom 2005) and recurrent interaction patterns of Pentland 
and Collaborators (1996). Two criteria of property rights and transaction costs from the New 
Institutional Economics paradigm were applied to a specific context. Insight from 
evolutionary economics (institutional path dependency) and behavioural economics had been 
also utilized. An eclectic combination of survey, multiple-cross case study and ethnographic 
research strategies had been employed. Five cases representing different sub markets in terms 
of size, type, location and the way actors were analysed. Analysis on path dependency show 
that despite the progress of knowledge and technology, the efficiency and flexible use of land 
and actual streams of rights enjoyed by right holders has not excelled what we achieved 
under the traditional and ingenious rist land tenure. Specifically the period after the 1975 
revolution has been marked by institutional development in which ideology, political and 
doctrinal considerations rather than appreciation to culture, tradition, societal value and 
norms played greater role. Such institutional environment led to the widening rift between 
formal and informal institutions leading to institutional mono cropping and institutional 
limbo at times. It has been ascertained also that informality is not limited to the low income 
groups and involves wide spectrum of actors across all case studies including real estate 
developers. Based on insights from Lefebvre (1967) ‘right to the city’ and Porto Alegre’s 
‘social urbanizers’, neither De Soto’s secured and stable property right through informal 
revolution nor khan’s social transformation by the capacity of dynamic states to make 
massive reallocation of pre-existing property rights in the interest of growth could guarantee 
fairness in access to resources and pave the way for transition to capitalist economy. Rather 
findings show that managing access and use of resources needs to be decentralised at 
community level (e.g. community land trust, business block associations, cooperatives etc.) 
with upgradable tenure rights and an institutional arrangement which allows the city 
government to augment market and community initiatives. Such kind of institutional 
arrangement addresses new housing needs of communities and provides incentive for 
inhabitants of slum and informal settlements to maintain their living environment.   
 
Regarding property right and transaction costs, currently a move from secured stable property 
rights to unstable and asymmetric property right has been observed with massive 
expropriation for land consolidation to promote growth of the city. Despite the legal backing 
some developers and pretty providers negotiate a purchase deal with the owner to maintain 
their social capital. Real estate actors are observed to have their own dimension of transaction 
costs. Explanation based on mental accounting from the behavioural economics describes the 
inconsistencies people experience in judging the relative value of money, in which contrary 
to the principle of fungibility a dollar is not always interchangeable with another dollar. 
Actors from the low and middle income groups are governed by the conviction expressed in 
the saying: “the poor doesn’t need to save on his energy” provided they anyhow succeed. 
Developers and petty providers express their feelings with a cautionary note of “…not a big 
problem as such…” Therefore the research concludes that transaction costs under a particular 
land tenure system need to be assessed in conjunction with the extent of property right the 
right holders enjoy and equity considerations. The research ascertained success factors for 
institutional reform which enable real estate markets to contribute for urban redevelopment: 
Firstly, the positive interaction among city/government and community/private actors while 
pursuing compatible goals which converge with broad societal goals. This is expressed in 
passive tolerance and latter incorporation in the case of the informal settlement, explicit 
facilitation and later partnership in the case of Merkato commercial center redevelopment 
case study. The second success factor is the attempt by the city government to create joint 
forums with user groups for participatory crafting of the rules of the game including urban 
plans. Institutions need to be also considered in their interdependent and interrelatedness to 
create synergy. The need to move towards new legality to resolve the conflict between formal 
and informal institutions has been also highlighted.  
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